This paper investigates the effect of ethnolinguistic conflict on redistribution. The analysis focuses on the conflict arising between "peripheral" minority groups and a dominant "center". We propose an index of linguistic conflict that (i) encompasses both diversity and polarization, and (ii) accounts for the distance between lanuguages. Our results suggest that linguistic diversity is a better predictor of redistribution than linguistic polarization. We also find that incorporating linguistic distances leads to better predictions. JEL: D6; D74; H5; Z10
United States, where there is a strong racial component to the income distribution, the poor are considered as "other" (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001) . In Western Europe the poor are instead viewed as "unlucky". If, as posited by Becker (1957) , individuals have stronger feelings of empathy towards their own group, it is not surprising that the U.S. exhibits lower levels of redistribution than Western European countries.
Compared to the existing literature on ethnolinguistic diversity and redistribution, we introduce three novelties. First, we focus on ethnolinguistic conflict that arises between a dominant "central" group and "peripheral" minority groups. Second, we explicitly allow for distances between groups. Third, we design an index able to capture both the notion of ethnolinguistic diversity and ethnolinguistic polarization. We now discuss each one of these contributions in detail.
A first novelty is to analyze ethnolinguistic conflict that originates between the "central" dominant group and several "peripheral" minorities. The standard approach to measuring diversity treats all groups in a symmetric way, and thus exclusively focuses on the number and the relative sizes of groups. However, in many societies conflict arises from the antagonism that minorities feel towards the dominant group, rather than from tension between all groups. To illustrate our approach, take the example of Spain.
We will assume that linguistic conflict arises mainly between speakers of Spanish and the different minority languages (Catalan, Basque and Galician), rather than between the minority groups themselves. Our goal, then, is to construct an index of peripheral ethnolinguistic diversity. We will focus on linguistic, rather than ethnical, diversity, where the dominant group either speaks the official language or is the largest group.
A second novelty is to include the distance between groups into our measure of diversity. The most commonly used measure in the literature is the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different groups. As with Shannon's diversity index (Shannon, 1949) , this so-called fractionalization index fails to take into account the degree of distinctiveness between different groups. However, one would probably agree that a country where, say, half of the population speaks Catalan and the other half speaks Spanish (two similar Romance languages) is less diverse than a country where half of the population speaks Dutch and the other half speaks French (a Germanic and a Romance language). In spite of that, in Alesina et al. (2003) Andorra is ranked as more diverse than either Belgium or Switzerland. Our prior is that the scope for conflict expands as the linguistic distance between groups grows. In the specific case of redistribution, we would expect altruism to decline as ethnolinguistic distance becomes larger. This is in line with the Becker (1957) view: individuals like their own group more, and how much they dislike other groups depends on how different they are. An appropriate analysis of ethnolinguistic diversity should therefore take into account the dissimilarity between groups. This point has previously been made by Caselli and Coleman (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) .
In spite of the importance of distance, not much theoretical and empirical work has focused on this issue. The type of diversity indices that incorporate distances are often not satisfactory for our purposes. For instance, Weitzman (1992) and Nehring and Puppe (2002) overlook the importance of the relative sizes of the different groups, and exclusively focus on the dissimilarities between groups. An approach, closer to what we do, is the one proposed by Greenberg (1956) , and more recently, by Laitin (2000) and Fearon (2003) . They generalize the fractionalization index by weighting the product of the sizes of any two groups by their linguistic distances. Our index differs from theirs in a number of respects. First, our focus is on peripheral diversity, so that the nature of the index is different. We do not treat diversity in a symmetric way, but rather focus on the diversity that emanates from the tension between the central dominant group and the peripheral minority groups. Second, our measure of distance is based on the proportion of cognates between languages elaborated by Dyen, Kruskal and Black (1992) . In contrast, Fearon (2003) uses language trees to compute distances. As will be discussed in the data section, we prefer the Dyen et al. (1992) distance matrix, because it provides more detailed information than language trees. Although the Dyen measure has been used previously in economics by Ginsburgh, Ortuño-Ortín and Weber (2005), it has not been applied to study linguistic diversity and polarization.
Whether including linguistic distances is relevant or not should eventually be an empirical question. We therefore test whether this feature improves upon the existing empirical results. To do so, we compare the index that includes distances to the index that does not, and analyze which one provides a better explanation of the level of redistribution. We find that the explanatory power of the index with linguistic distances is superior. This result is shown to be robust to a number of different specifications.
Quantitatively the effect of peripheral diversity is important. With an average level of redistribution of 14%, an increase of one standard deviation in the degree of diversity lowers redistribution by around 1.6 percentage points. When comparing highly diverse countries to less diverse countries, the effect is obviously bigger. For instance, the model predicts redistribution in Canada to be 5.9 percentage points lower than in Denmark.
A third novelty of our paper, compared to existing work, is that our index encompasses both the notions of diversity and polarization. By designing such an index, we bring together two branches of the literature. On the one hand, the work on diversity -or fractionalization -has argued that the degree of social conflict is positively correlated with the level of diversity. Alesina et al. (2003) , for instance, look at the impact of ethnolinguistic diversity on different economic variables, such as economic growth and the size of the welfare state. On the other hand, social conflict may also depend on a society's degree of polarization (Esteban and Ray, 1994) . To give some intuition about the difference between polarization and diversity, suppose country A is composed of two equally sized linguistic groups and country B of three equally sized linguistic groups. In that case, country A would be more polarized, but less diverse, than country B. 3 Although our main focus is on diversity, our index will be flexible enough to account for both diversity and polarization.
Here as well, whether diversity or polarization is a better predictor of redistribution is an empirical question. In the empirical section our prior is that a higher degree of linguistic conflict lowers redistribution. We then let the data tell us which measure of 3 A third view, in between diversity and polarization, claims that social conflict may depend on the degree of disenfranchisement (Ginsburgh et al., 2005). In the specific context of languages, disenfranchisement can be understood as the cost incurred by minority language speakers to learn the majority language.
peripheral linguistic conflict -diversity or polarization -does a better job at explaining redistribution. We find that diversity tends to be a better predictor, though there is substantial overlap between both notions of linguistic conflict.
The General Model
Consider a country whose population consists of N citizens and is partitioned in K + 1 distinct groups, labeled 0, 1, . . . , K. One group, 0, called "center" or "dominant group", consists of N 0 individuals, whereas the other K groups, called "minorities", consist of N k individuals each. We impose no condition on the geographical distribution of the groups. Thus, it might be that all individuals from a group live in the same region or that individuals from different groups live in the same region. Each citizen of the country belongs to one and only one group, i.e.,
It will be convenient to deal with the population share of each group rather than its absolute size, and for every k = 0, ..., K we denote
This implies that a country's population size will not matter in our analysis.
Our model focuses on the frequently observed cases where the "dominant" group contains at least as many individuals as any of the minority groups:
We examine the subset of vectors S that satisfy this dominance condition:
One might claim that our assumption on the size of the dominant group rules out many interesting historical examples. For example, many colonies had an official language that was only spoken by a small dominant elite. In our empirical part, however, the official language in most countries corresponds to the one spoken by the largest groups. 4 A crucial element of our model is the introduction of ethnolinguistic distance between groups. Thus, there is a matrix T that assigns the distance τ kl to each pair of groups k and l. We assume that all values τ kl lie between 0 and 1, and τ kl = τ lk . The set of such matrices is denoted by T . In this paper we identify such distance between groups with the linguistic distance, i.e., groups are formed by individuals who speak the same language and τ kl is the linguistic distance between the language spoken by group k and the language spoken by group l. 5
The population shares and linguistic distances will be enough to determine the level of peripheral diversity. To do so, we proceed in three steps. First, we define the notion of inter-group alienation. Second, we use this concept to define peripheral alienation. Third, we show that under certain axioms peripheral alienation can be interpreted as peripheral diversity.
We start by defining the notion of inter-group alienation. Formally, we assume there exists an alienation function f such that the value of inter-group alienation between groups k and l is given by the value of the function f ,
which depends on the size of both groups and their linguistic distance. At this point we do not provide any type of individual foundation of such group function f . However, in Section 3 we discuss some examples in which the function f is constructed from an alienation function at the individual level. 6 4 An exception are countries with more than one official language, such as Belgium and Switzerland. 5 This is similar to the resemblance function of Greenberg (1956). 6 The way our diversity index is constructed is based more on a "primordialist" view of ethnolinguistic conflict than on an "instrumentalist" view. The primordialist view essentially says that the ethnic composition of society enters directly into the utility function of the agents. See Caselli (2002) for a discussion of these two categories of ethnolinguistic conflict.
As alluded to previously, we consider the notion of peripheral alienation, where the only type of inter-group alienation accounted for is the one from the minority groups towards the center (centrifugal alienation) and from the center towards the minority groups (centripetal alienation). Thus, the relevant information needed in our analysis consists of the functions f (s 0 , s k , τ 0k ), that give the centrifugal alienation experienced by each of the k = 1, ..., K minority groups towards the center, and the functions f 0 (s 0 , s k , τ 0k ), that give the centrifugal alienation experienced by the center towards each of the k = 1, ..., K minority groups. Since the the center is the dominant group, it is natural to allow the functional forms of f and f 0 to be different.
Then for every s = (s 0 , ..., s K ) ∈ S, T ∈ T , f and f 0 we define the total level of peripheral alienation CD(s, T ) as
The following conditions introduce some more structure, and will allow us to interpret CD(s, T ) as a measure of peripheral diversity. 
Condition 1 and 2 impose continuity and monotonicity. Condition 3 is the key one to obtain an index of diversity. If f is concave on the size of the group, smaller groups experience, in "per capita" terms, more alienation than larger groups. In the case the alienation functions are differentiable, the supermodularity condition states that ∂f(s 0 ,s, τ ) ∂s∂τ > 0.
To maximize peripheral alienation, the following proposition says that minority groups that are farther away from the center should be larger. Proposition 1 says that, if τ 0k ≥ τ 0l , i.e., if group k is more distant from the center than group l, maximum peripheral alienation should satisfy s * k ≥ s * l . Note that when τ 0k = τ 0l the proposition implies that s * k = s * l . In this case, the problem resembles the traditional approach to diversity where only the sizes of the groups matter. In that context it is commonly assumed that an index of diversity should satisfy a property similar to the one stated in Proposition 1, namely that diversity is maximized when there is an equal number of individuals in each group. 7 Thus, if Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold, our index CD(s, T ) can be interpreted as an index of peripheral diversity. 8 The proposition clarifies the relationship between diversity and the nature of the inter-group alienation function. Thus, whenever the functions f and f 0 are concave on 7 For example, Shannon's information entropy index satisfies this property (Shannon, 1949) . 8 Notice that Condition 3 requires concavity of the function f 0 (s 0 , ., τ). Thus, such concavity, together with the other conditions, is sufficient to obtain that the solution to the maximization problem stated in the proposition is given by s * k ≥ s * l . However, concavity of f0(s0, ., τ) is not a necessary condition to obtain the solution. For example, if the function f (s 0 , ., τ ) is concave and its value large enough the function f0(s0, ., τ ) might be convex. the size of the group, the index CD can be seen as satisfying a necessary condition to be interpreted as a peripheral diversity index.
At this point, one might ask what would happen if instead of Condition 3, we impose the "opposite" condition by taking the functions f(s 0 , ., τ ) and f 0 (s 0 , ., τ) to be convex. It is not difficult to see that this would imply that if groups k and l have the same linguistic distance to the center, maximum total peripheral alienation is achieved when one of them gets the maximum possible population and the other gets zero population.
This alternative property could be seen as a necessary condition to obtain an index of peripheral polarization instead of an index of peripheral diversity. Thus, depending on whether one believes that inter-group alienation increases in the size of the group in a concave way or in a convex way, the aggregate index CD can be interpreted as satisfying a necessary property of either a measure of diversity or a measure of polarization.
A specific index of peripheral alienation
In this section we provide a specific form for the inter-group alienation functions f and f 0 .
These functions will be the ones used in the empirical part. In contrast to our approach in the previous section, we deduce them from assumptions at the individual level.
To come up with such functions, we follow the identification-alienation framework of Esteban and Ray (1994), though we will allow for a more flexible approach. An individual who speaks language k feels identified with other individuals who speak the same language. This sense of identification is a function of the size of the group, and is represented by s α k . In Esteban and Ray (1994) α is positive, implying that the sense of identification is stronger the bigger the group. In contrast, we prefer not to restrict the value of α. Indeed, it may very well be that the sense of identification becomes smaller as the group becomes larger, in which case α < 0. There are many examples in the world of small linguistic, cultural or religious groups feeling a keener sense of community and a stronger desire to assert their identity.
An agent speaking language k feels more alienated from someone speaking language j the greater the distance τ kj . This alienation (or antagonism) is influenced by the sense of identification. In particular, an individual attaches more weight to the distance τ kj if his sense of identification is stronger. As defined in Esteban and Ray (1994) , the alienation between an individual speaking language k and an individual speaking language j is s α k τ kj . Since there is a proportion s 0 of individuals speaking the dominant language, the centrifugal alienation of an agent speaking minority language k is s β 0 s α k τ 0k . In Esteban and Ray (1994), β = 1. In our case, we suppose that an individual's centrifugal alienation only depends on there being an official or dominant language, independently of how many people actually speak that dominant language, so that we set β = 0. In that case, an individual's centrifugal alienation is s α k τ 0k . However, the qualitative empirical findings do not change under the alternative specification of β = 1.
If each individual speaking minority language k feels an alienation s α k τ 0k , and if a share s k of the population speaks language k, then the centrifugal alienation of all speakers of language k is s 1+α k τ 0k . Thus, the inter-group alienation function f is given by
We assume that individuals of the center have the same type of alienation function as individuals of the minority groups, except for the fact that in this case β is set to 1.
Indeed, the centripetal alienation felt by members of the central group should depend on the size of the minorities, so that
We can now define the total level of peripheral alienation by plugging (2) and (3) into (1):
This is the index we will be using in the empirical section of the paper.
Depending on the value of α, (4) can be interpreted as an index of peripheral diversity or an index of peripheral polarization. In particular, if α < 0, this index satisfies Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4, and can thus be seen as an index of peripheral diversity. If, in contrast, α > 0, the function f would be convex, and (4) could be interpreted as an index of peripheral polarization. 9 To illustrate the difference between diversity and polarization, consider a country with three linguistic groups. Their respective sizes are s 0 , s 1 and s 2 . Language 0 is the dominant language, and languages 1 and 2 are the minority languages. Further assume that the distance between each minority language and the dominant language is 1. Index
We can now interpret this example for the two cases we have in mind. If α < 0 we get a measure reflecting diversity (or fractionalization). For a given share of the dominant language, the maximum diversity is reached when s 1 = s 2 . In other words, we get most diversity with two (equally sized) minority languages. If α > 0 we get a measure reflecting polarization, which is highest if one of the two remaining languages disappears. In other words, polarization is greatest if we have only one, rather than two, minority languages. This insight does not change once we allow for different distances between languages.
Data and measurement issues
Our data set covers most countries in Europe and the Americas. The information on how many people speak a given language in a given country come from two different data sources, the Ethnologue project (Grimes and Grimes, 1996) 10 Greek to the Indoeuropean one and Turkish to the Altaic one. If we do not account for distances between languages, it would make sense to consider speakers of Dutch and
Flemish to belong to the same group. This is what makes the less detailed Britannica more appropriate than the more detailed Ethnologue in the analysis of Alesina et al. (2003) . However, once we correct for linguistic distances, using more disaggregate data may be preferable. To go back to our previous example, our data on linguistic distances says that the distance between Dutch and Flemish is 0.046, whereas the distance between Dutch and Turkish is 1. Once we take this information into account, maintaining the disaggregation between Dutch and Flemish may be desirable.
While including linguistic distances takes a step in the right direction, the issue of the appropriate level of disaggregation does not disappear altogether. Even after controlling for linguistic distances, the number of groups continues to be important in our diversity index, and in that sense the level of disaggregation still matters. This issue is especially relevant in the case of the indigenous languages of the Americas. To give an example, the number of languages reported in the Ethnologue for Mexico is 295, including 52 types of Mixteco and 27 types of Nahuatl. Clearly, the level of diversity picked up by our index will depend on whether we aggregate the 52 types of Mixteco into a single group or not. We had to make a value judgment in this case, and decided in favor of aggregation. We took this approach for all indigenous languages in the Americas. To aggregate appropriately, we used the information on language families provided by the Ethnologue. Doing this in the case of Mexico grouped the indigenous languages into eight language families.
Although we believe we have made substantial progress in solving the problem of aggregation by including linguistic distances, we are aware that our solution is not perfect.
As a robustness check, we therefore compute separate diversity indices, one based on the more detailed Ethnologue, and another based on the less detailed Britannica. The cross-country data for the indices we computed are reported in Table 1 and Table 2 .
The distances we use in our diversity index (4) we have had to made a couple of choices. First, when no information was available on the distance between two varieties of the same language, we based ourselves on the distance between Dutch and Flemish and set that distance to be 0.05. We applied this to the distance between, for instance, Asturian and Spanish, and Ligurian and Italian.
Second, we set the distance between any non Indoeuropean language and an Indoeuropean language to the maximum level of 1. This is the case of the distance between, for instance, Finnish and Swedish, Hungarian and Romanian, or Mayan and Spanish. Given our focus on peripheral diversity, we did not have to compute distances between different non Indoeuropean languages. 12 We are not the first to introduce distances into indices of diversity. Fearon (2003) and Laitin (2000), based on the work of Greenberg (1956), have proposed a generalization of the fractionalization index by including linguistic distance. They use language trees from the Ethnologue project and base the resemblance between two languages on the number of branches they have in common. We prefer to use the Dyen et al. (1992) matrix, mainly because the information provided is finer. If, instead, we had used language trees from the Ethnologue, the number of branches in common would have ranged from 0 (if the two languages pertained to different families, such as Turkish and Greek) to 9 (in the case of Franco-Provençal and French). This would have given us 10 possible distances between languages. In contrast, the percentage cognate approach in Dyen et al. (1992) gives a distance between languages which could be anywhere between 0 and 1. Note that in some cases the difference between the two measures is actually quite significant.
For instance, in the index proposed by Fearon (2003) (4),
In our empirical work we take α = −1/2. 14 Using the Ethnologue data, the first column of Table 3 gives the ranking of countries according to linguistic diversity when we include distances between languages. The second column gives the same ranking but not allowing for different distances between languages. In this case the distance τ jk between any two languages j • Bulgaria moves up 17 positions in the ranking when we allow for different distances between languages. This is because Bulgaria has a sizeable Turkish minority, and because the distance between Turkish and Bulgarian is large.
• Something similar happens to Estonia, that moves up 6 positions, and Finland, that moves up 9 positions. In both of these countries the dominant groups speaks a non Indoeuropean language, but each has Indoeuropean speaking minorities: Russian in the case of Estonia and Swedish in the case of Finland.
• Other countries that become more diverse once we introduce different distances 1 4 We experimented with different values for α < 0. This did not change the results. • Spain goes the other way, and drops 16 positions in the ranking, once we allow for different distances between languages. The two large minorities (Galician and Catalan) speak languages very similar to Spanish. Andorra is another interesting case, with 53% of the population Catalan speaking and 42% Spanish speaking.
Andorra drops 22 positions when we account for linguistic distances.
• Other countries that move down in the ranking are Ukraine (drops 21 positions) and
Belarus (drops 20 position). The differences between Ukranian and Russian, and between Byelorussian and Russian, are small. Germany and Italy also lose positions, because the most important minorities are dialects of German and Italian. Table 4 reports the results of our regressions of redistribution on peripheral diversity, and a number of control variables. Robust t-values are given in brackets. As explained before, the theoretical prior is that the greater the degree of peripheral diversity, the lower the degree of redistribution. The data on languages are taken from the Ethnologue.
Peripheral diversity and redistribution
Column (1) have argued that GDP per capita may be endogenous. One should therefore be cautious about including GDP per capita. Note, however, that the variable of interest -peripheral diversity -does not change, neither in magnitude of its coefficient nor in statistical significance. This robustness is confirmed by column (5) , which takes the previous specification with GDP per capita, and adds legal origin and religious composition. In this case, socialist legal origin becomes statistically significant and gets the expected positive sign. Column (6) throws population in our basic specification. Maybe surprisingly, the coefficient is not statistically significant, although its coefficient has the expeted positive sign. Finally, column (7) consists of the full specification, including all control variables.
Again, population size does not seem to matter.
Based on Table 4 , we can see that in all specifications the effect of peripheral diversity is robust, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. In all specifications peripheral diversity is significant at the 1% level, and the magnitude of its coefficient hov- As for the control variables, neither the legal origin nor the religious composition seems to have a significant impact on redistribution. An exception to this is socialist legal origin, although its effect only shows up if we control for GDP per capita. In those regressions, the effect of having a socialist legal origin increases redistribution by 11 percentage points. Latitude is significant and positive in all specifications. This is a common result in the literature. The Latin American dummy seems to be partly picking up other variables. Once we introduce GDP per capita and control for religious composition and legal origin, it loses all significance.
The small island dummy is highly significant and its coefficient is robust to all specifications. Being a small island is predicted to reduce redistribution by 7 to 10 per-centage points of GDP. As argued before, the small island dummy may partly be picking up population size. This may explain why population shows up as being statistically insignificant. Indeed, both variables measure the size of the country. However, of the two, the small island dummy is the more exogenous one, and therefore preferable. It is well known that country size is endogenous: borders change and people may migrate because of redistribution. The endogeneity of the border is largely absent in the case of small islands though.
As mentioned in the previous section, diversity may also be endogenous. As instrument, one would ideally want to have a measure of diversity that dates back to a period when redistribution was still very limited. Unfortunately, the earliest data on the number of speakers of different languages seem to have been compiled by Muller (1964).
Although these data do not go back as far in time and are not as detailed as we would like, we use them to compute a peripheral diversity index for the beginning of the 1960s.
We employ that variable to instrument for peripheral diversity in the 1990s. The results are reported in Table 5 . As can be seen, instrumenting does not change the picture. The effect of peripheral diversity on redistribution is unchanged, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Table 6 runs the same regressions as Table 3 , but uses a peripheral diversity index which does not allow for different distances between languages. We will focus on our variable of interest -peripheral diversity -as the coefficients on the control variables are similar to what we found in Table 4 . The most obvious result is that the peripheral diversity index loses statistical significance. In none of the regressions is the index significant at the 10% level. Not surprisingly, all specifications also give lower R 2 s compared to Table 4 . This leads us to conclude that including distances into our diversity index improves results substantially. Our understanding of diversity is therefore much enhanced when we introduce linguistic distances in our index.
As a further robustness check, we compute our peripheral diversity index using the Britannica data. The results reported in Table 7 confirms our previous findings.
Peripheral diversity is statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications, and its point estimate is fairly stable. In Table 8 we run the same regressions, but now using the diversity index which does not account for linguistic distances. As before, we find that not including linguistic distances leads to worse results. Both the statistical significance and the explanatory power of the regressions drop across all specifications.
However, note that the difference between including distances and not including distances is smaller when using the Britannica data than when using the Ethnologue data. This is to be expected. As argued before, failing to take into account distances is not as bad when one uses more aggregate data. For instance, the problem of the different Italian or German dialects does not appear in the Britannica data set, while it does in the Ethnologue.
Peripheral diversity and peripheral polarization
Some authors have argued that the degree of social conflict has more to do with polarization than with diversity (Esteban and Ray, 1994). As already mentioned in the theoretical section, if α > 0, our index (4) can be interpreted as one of peripheral polarization, rather than peripheral diversity. We now explore whether diversity or polarization does a better job at explaining redistribution. To compute our indices of peripheral polarization, we set α = 1 in (4). 15 Table 9 compares the country ranking of polarization and diversity. The correlation between the two measures is 0.79; the rank correlation is even higher and stands at 0.93. In spite of that, there are some differences worth pointing out. Countries with large immigrant populations tend to be diverse but not polarized. The United States, for instance, drops 17 positions when comparing polarization to diversity. European countries with a substantial number of immigrants, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France, exhibit a similar pattern. Countries that move the other way, and are more polarized than diverse, include Andorra and Trinidad. As already mentioned, Andorra is split up in half between Catalan and Spanish speakers. In Trinidad, for its part, 70% of the population speaks English Creole and the remaining 30% speaks Hindustani. Table 10 reports the same regressions as before, focusing on peripheral polarization, rather than peripheral diversity. Given that the effect of the control variables is similar, we will exclusively focus on the polarization index. Using column (5) We now try to understand whether polarization or diversity does a better job at explaining redistribution. In terms of statistical significance, polarization performs slightly worse. The polarization index is statistically significant at the 5% level in 5 out of the 7 specifications, whereas the diversity index is statistically significant at the 1% level in all regressions. The R 2 s give a similar picture, with polarization performing somewhat worse than diversity. The fact that polarization and diversity give similar results is not surprising. Many highly diverse societies also tend to be highly polarized.
The high correlation between both indices indicate a substantial overlap between both concepts. In fact, the polarization index may be picking up the effect of diversity, or vice versa. One possible way of testing which of the two concepts is more powerful in explaining redistribution is to run regressions that include both the diversity index and the polarization index as explanatory variables. These results are reported in Table 11 .
While we have to be cautious because of possible multicollinearity between both indices, the results we get are quite compelling. The polarization index loses all significance, and its point estimate varies widely depending on the specification. In contrast, the diversity index still exhibits a high degree of significance. In 6 out of the 7 specifications its coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, its point estimate is relatively stable, and not much changed compared to what we found in Table 3 . All of this suggests diversity taking the upper hand when explaining redistribution.
Regarding the importance of distance, our findings in the case of polarization reinforce our previous results. If one does not allow for different distances between languages, the polarization index loses all significance. Those results are reported in Table   12 . When analyzing social conflict, whether the focus is on diversity or polarization, it seems crucial to consider the distances between groups.
Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the effect of linguistic conflict on redistribution. In particular, we have analyzed the conflict arising between peripheral minority groups and a dominant center. Our main contribution is to have explicitly introduced linguistic distances into our measure of linguistic conflict. The empirical part of the paper shows that this improves results substantially. Although ourfocus was on diversity, our index is able to encompass both diversity and polarization. The advantage of such an index is that we can let the data tell us which notion of linguistic conflict, diversity or polarization, is more appropriate when explaining redistribution. The index we propose could of course be applied to study the effect of diversity (or polarization) on other economic variables, such as economic growth, the quality of the government, or the degree of decentralization. 7 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 1) First consider the case τ 0k = τ 0l = τ . We have to show that s * k ≥ s * l . Suppose to the contrary that s * k < s * l . Let s 0 ∈ S kl (s) be such that s 0 j = s * j for all j 6 = k , j 6 = l and
We have that CD(s 0 , T ) < CD(s * , T ) , and this inequality implies
+f 0 (s 0 , s * k , τ) + f 0 (s 0 , s * l , τ)
By Condition 3, functions f(s 0 , ., τ) and f 0 (s 0 , ., τ) are concave, which implies
and
It is straightforward to see that inequalities (6), (7) and (5) can not hold simultaneously. Thus, we have that s * k ≥ s * l . Notice that τ 0l = τ 0k implies s * l ≥ s * k and s * k ≥ s * l so that s * k = s * l . 2) Consider the case τ 0k > τ 0l . We shall show that s * k ≥ s * l . Suppose otherwise that s * k < s * l .Let T 0 ∈ T , be such that τ 0 0j = τ 0j for all j 6 = l and τ 0 0l = τ 0k . Notice that τ 0 0j > τ 0l . In the same way as above let s 0 ∈ S kl (s) be such that s 0 j = s * j for all j 6 = k , j 6 = l and s 0 k = s 0 l = x ≡ s * k +s * l 2 . We have that CD(s 0 , T ) < CD(s * , T )
This implies that
that is equivalent to
< f(s 0 , s * l , τ l ) − f(s 0 , x, τ l ) + f 0 (s 0 , s * l , τ l ) − f 0 (s 0 , x, τ l )
By the same argument as the one used in case 1 above we know that
which implies that
that rearranging terms is
Inequalities (10) and (2) imply
Since s * l > x and τ k > τ l Axiom 3 implies that
and (14) and (2) can not hold simultaneously. Hence we conclude that s * k ≥ s * l . . • Latin American dummy: dummy for all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Small island dummy: islands with a population of less than 0.5 million in 1990. Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 10% Absolute value of robust t statistics in parenthesis *significant at 5% **significant at 1% 
